This article seeks to address an old and recurring theme in development economics-the slow adoption of new technologies by farmers in many developing countries. We explore a somewhat novel explanation for this puzzle-the link between market access and the incentives to adopt a new technology when there are non-convexities. We develop a theoretical model to guide the empirical analysis that uses spatially disaggregated agricultural production data from the International Food Policy Research Institute and Living Standards Measurement Study survey data for Nigeria. We estimate the impact of transport costs on crop production, adoption of modern technologies, and the differential impact on returns of modern versus traditional farmers. To overcome the limitation of data availability on travel costs for much of Africa, we combine road survey data and GIS roads networks to generate the most thorough and accurate road network available, to our knowledge. Using these data and the Highway Development Management Model (HDM-4), we compute minimum travel costs from each location to the market. Consistent with our theory we find that transportation costs are critical in determining technology choices, with a greater responsiveness among farmers who adopt modern technologies, and at times a perverse (negative) response to lower transport costs among those who employ more traditional techniques. In sum, we present compelling evidence that the constraints to the adoption of modern technologies and access to markets are interconnected, and so should be targeted jointly.
Yields across many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have stagnated and even declined in some countries, despite the availability of new agricultural technologies, improvements in transportation infrastructure, and policy reforms aimed at market liberalization (Besley and Case 1993; Binswanger-Mkhize and Savastano 2014) . A comparison of Africa's performance with that in South America and three subregions of Asia over the course of two decades indicates that Africa showed lower total factor productivity (TFP) growth overall than its counterparts in the 1990s, then fell even further behind in the 2000s, magnifying the TFP gap (World Bank 2013 and Fuglie, Wang, and Ball 2012) . On top of the lagging Richard Damania is a Lead Economist, Claudia Berg is an Economist, Jason Russ is an Economist, Federico Barra is Land Administration Specialist, and John Nash is a Lead Economist, all at the World Bank. Rubaba Ali is an Economist at Fannie Mae. Correspondence may be sent to: rdamania@worldbank.org.
TFP growth, Africa's use of fertilizer has also increased much more slowly than other regions. Since the 1980s, fertilizer intensity in SSA grew on average by 0.93% annually compared to 5% in South Asia (Slootmaker 2013) . With neither modern input use nor TFP growth keeping pace, it is not surprising that yields are falling farther behind as well. In 1961, SSA as a whole had cereal yields around 0.75 MT/ha, while Asia and Latin America's yields were about 1.25 MT/ha. Over the next 5 decades (through 2011), yields in these other developing regions approximately tripled, while those in SSA increased by around two-thirds, with about half of that coming in the last 5 years of that period (World Resources Institute 2013) . With a population that is set to double by 2040 at current trends, these are worrying signs for a region that aspires to generate food surpluses.
Numerous explanations have been offered for the low productivity of agriculture in Africa. Early work focused on the need for c The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com price reforms to sharpen producer incentives and promote greater competition and efficiency (World Bank 2012) . Other studies highlight the role of transactions costs; if there are impediments to market participation, price incentives will be dampened and may even be rendered ineffectual (Schiff and Montenegro 1997 ; for a recent study of agricultural intensification in Africa, see Binswanger-Mkhize and Savastano 2014). Another strand of literature studies the reasons for the slow adoption of modern technologies and advances numerous explanations including learning impediments, credit constraints, risk, and farmer heterogeneity. For an early and concise summary, see Feder, Just, and Zilberman (1985) .
Undoubtedly, many factors play a role in depressing the productivity of African agriculture. Our article makes a modest contribution to this extensive literature by recognizing that agricultural transformation involves interlinked processes, and explores why a significant fraction of farmers in developing countries may not adopt more modern technologies despite the potential for these to increase yields. It is hypothesized that there are non-convexities in switching to alternative technologies. These may arise from a variety of factors including fixed costs (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) of adopting a new technology or process, indivisibilities (such as the size of a machine), non-linear prices, or increasing returns to scale, among other factors. It is suggested that barriers to the adoption of newer technologies occur from the interaction between these nonconvexities and access to markets. In what follows we focus on this hitherto neglected link.
To frame the analysis, we outline a minimalist model of technology adoption with transport costs. It is assumed that there are fixed costs, or minimum threshold costs, to adopting more modern agricultural inputs (e.g., a minimum rental or purchase price of tractors, harvesters, and planters, learning costs, etc.). Analogous to the big-push literature, a switch from traditional techniques to more modern farming occurs if the gain in payoffs from switching exceeds, the fixed costs of the new technology. Unlike the big-push models, or the technology adoption literature, the outcome does not necessarily depend on the decisions of other farmers, demand externalities, risk, or market imperfections. The fixed costs (which can be interpreted broadly) create a hurdle that households must overcome in order to adopt the more productive technology. Transport costs influence the returns to technology adoption and thereby create heterogeneity in responses. Constraints to technology adoption can impede entry into markets and lock farmers into traditional, low input modes of production, while variations in transport costs generate differences in returns.
Our model generates two testable hypotheses. First, that adoption of new technologies will be more pervasive where transport costs are lower. And second, that reductions in transport costs will have a larger impact on the revenue of farmers already utilizing more modern farming techniques than on the revenue of those still using traditional technologies. The policy implication is that there is a need to target both issues-lowering transport costs, and removing other barriers farmers face to adopting improved technologies-to trigger transformational improvements in production in developing countries.
The empirical analysis is based on Nigeria. To motivate the issue empirically, we begin by presenting preliminary evidence using spatially disaggregated agricultural production data from the International Food Policy Research Institute's (IFPRI) Spatial Production Allocation Model (SPAM). The SPAM dataset is particularly useful for our purposes as it distinguishes clearly how much of each crop is produced under different input levels and technologies (high input/technology versus low input/technology). Consistent with the theoretical model, these indicative results suggest that farmers' responses to changes in transport costs are heterogeneous and vary systematically with production technology decisions and crop type. Decreasing transport costs increase the production of crops using high input (more modern) production systems, but has no effect or even a seemingly perverse, negative effect on the production of crops using low input systems. The SPAM data, while useful, is limited and cannot explain when and why farmers switch technology and the precise mechanisms by which transportation costs affect technology choice, and thus, production levels.
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To explore these links in further detail, a rich data set is used from the Nigeria Living Standards Measurement Study: Integrated Survey on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA), which contains household-level data on production revenues and technology choices as well as household characteristics. In evaluating the effect of transport costs on agriculture empirically, we consider three aspects. Households face a discrete decision on technology choice-to produce using traditional input levels, or to pay a fixed cost (or cost with a minimum threshold) and use more modern techniques. Households also face two continuous decisions on how much to actually produce and their level of market participation (i.e., what share of crops should be consumed at home versus sold at the market). Consistent with the theory, the results suggest that a) farmers with lower transport costs exhibit a greater proclivity to adopt modern techniques, and b) the revenue of farmers using modern techniques is also more responsive to changes in transport costs. We show that the empirical results for both the LSMS and SPAM datasets are robust to an alternative instrumental variable, alternative specifications, and various definitions of transport costs (please see the online supplemental appendix).
These findings advance the literature on the role of transport costs in promoting agricultural transitions. Transport infrastructure is costly and despite significant investments, has often failed to induce a transition to modernization. Likewise, despite the availability of modern farming methods, adoption rates in Africa have been below desired levels. Our analysis suggests the two outcomes are connected and need to be tackled simultaneously. Adoption of modern technologies (and by implication, the production of a surplus) is a prerequisite for enhancing output and promoting market participation. Lower transport costs may assist in stimulating market participation but may not be sufficient, especially among the most marginal farmers. That is, modest changes in transport costs may not in itself stimulate large numbers of farmers to make the technological leap, as there are high barriers to modernization. Hence, there is a need for broader policies that consider the bundling of incentives-policies focused on improving technology availability need to consider constraints on connectivity, and vice-versa.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief survey of the literature. The third section outlines the theoretical model that guides the empirical work. The fourth section discusses two of the novel datasets used herein to estimate transportation costs and their effects. The fifth section presents the empirical analysis using the SPAM data and the sixth section discusses the LSMS analysis. The last section concludes. Robustness checks are reported in the online supplemental appendix.
Literature Survey
This section provides a brief review of three prominent, though often unconnected, strands of literature that seek to explain the slow pace of agricultural transformation, especially in SSA. The first strand is that of technology adoption in agriculture; second is the big-push literature; and finally a somewhat separate body of literature on the commercialization of farming. The purpose is not to provide a comprehensive review of these burgeoning areas of research, but merely to highlight some of the more prominent contributions.
There is a vast and varied body of literature analyzing factors that affect technology adoption in the United States (Griliches 1957) , and in developing countries (Besley and Case 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and Udry 2010; Moser and Barrett 2006; Croppenstedt, Demeke, and Meschi 2003) . The constraining factors identified in the literature are a lack of knowledge about new technology (Besley and Case 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and Udry 2010) , capital market imperfections (Croppenstedt, Demeke, and Meschi 2003) and heterogeneity among farmers (Suri 2011) . However, in recent years it is risk that has gained the most traction as an explanation for the slow adoption of technologies (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011; Lamb 2003) . Binding wealth or liquidity constraints, combined with uncertain fluctuations in output, can induce the adoption of known and safer technologies. The findings from the literature suggest the need for reducing risk exposure through the provision of (perhaps subsidized) credit or insurance mechanisms, and improvement in access to information related to modern technology through better extension service provision. The resulting policy suggestions have thus targeted largely standard prescriptions.
There is also an extensive body of literature focused on big-push models and coordination failures. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) was among the first to examine basic coordination failures. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) formalized the approach, presenting a theoretical model depicting the conditions under which there would be multiple stable equilibria-including an inferior equilibrium, also known as a poverty or underdevelopment trap.
2 In this context it may be necessary for a "big push," such as a large investment, to drive the economy to the superior equilibrium. 3 The implication is that investment in infrastructure will push local economies from traditional sectors to modern industries, and thus induce the adoption of superior technologies. An empirical example of the big push literature is Emran and Shilpi (2002) , who present evidence of spillovers of sales decisions at the household-level, stemming from increasing returns to scale in marketing.
Finally, there is a rich and related strand of literature addressing the determinants of small farmer participation in markets, with a special focus on Africa. The literature begins with the presumption that transactions costs-broadly defined-impede decisions to enter markets. Thus, policies such as the construction of roads and other infrastructure that lower these transaction costs will promote agricultural commercialization (Goetz 1992; Heltberg and Tarp 2001; Key, Sadoulet, de Janvry 2000) . Several studies seek to estimate the size of the unobserved transaction costs. As an example, Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja (2004) find that transaction costs are the equivalent of a 15% ad valorem tax in Kenya. Consistent with these results, Abrar, Morrissey, and Rayner (2004) find that integration into markets in Northern Ethiopia is 2 Under pecuniary externalities (where one farmer's actions affect his neighbors' costs) and complementarities (where one farmer's actions influence his neighbors' incentives to take similar actions), there may be two stable equilibria.
3 For example, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) present a model of investment in infrastructure whereby industrialization will only occur if a railroad is built (the logic is easily extended to transport infrastructure more generally). Cottage industries do not need a railroad and can locate anywhere, while modern sectors in contrast must cluster around the road. low and as a result there is little responsiveness to price incentives. There is, however, a dissenting view. Holloway and Lapar (2007) and Lapar, Holloway, and Ehui (2003) find that market access is not correlated to market participation once a correction is made for spatial autocorrelation. Takeshima and Winter-Nelson (2011) study the decisionmaking process for market participation and conclude that market participation and production decisions are made sequentially by farmers in Benin. This result confirms earlier work by Bellemare and Barrett (2006) . Most of the studies find that wealthier households have a higher probability of selling in markets-though reverse causality cannot be ruled out. While there is much discussion of market access costs in this literature, to our knowledge none of this work considers the problems that arise with the endogeneity of infrastructure-especially roads.
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This article seeks to augment this literature by suggesting that the constraints to technology adoption (modernization of agriculture) and market participation are likely closely linked due to non-convexities in technology adoption. We explore the nature of the links and suggest how policies that reduce transportation costs impact technology adoption and facilitate market participation. The following section provides the theoretical motivation for the empirical analysis that follows.
The Model
This section outlines a minimalist model that describes the manner in which responses might diverge between different types of farmers. We distinguish between traditional farmers who utilize a lower productivity technology and those who adopt improved technology that generates higher payoffs and yields. In contrast to the existing literature, the focus is not on differences in factor endowments, risk, or imperfections in capital or labor markets that might lead to differential responses. Instead, we present a model with identical endowments where differences emerge simply from non-convexitiesspecifically the need to cover the fixed costs of accessing a more productive technology. Such non-convexities may emerge either from the technology per se (such as if there is a minimum size or other indivisibility), non-linear pricing (such as when a machine is rented for a minimum amount of time), or information and learning costs (such as learning how to drive a tractor, or grow a new crop) and other forms of inertia.
5 Analogous to the big-push literature-a switch from traditional to more modern farming occurs if the payoffs from switching exceed the fixed costs of adopting the new technology. Unlike the big-push models, the outcome does not necessarily depend on the decisions of other farmers, demand factors, or market failures. This theoretical framework fits into a larger family of models of technology choices developed by Mundlak (1988) and later applied by Mundlak, Butzer, and Larson (2012) , Mundlak, Larson, and Butzer (1999) , and Larson and León (2006) . Essentially, farmers face different circumstances (different roads, markets, climates, etc.) and so choose different technology choices so as to maximize their profit. By making technology choices, farmers move between production functions as well as along them.
For brevity, a stylized version of the model that underlies the empirical work is outlined, based on specific functional forms that yield closed-form solutions. Generalizations without these functional forms are straightforward.
There are two types of farmers in the model: traditional farmers who use a less productive technology and those with an improved technology such as access to (better or any) machinery. Use of the improved technology requires payment of a fixed cost (F) that enhances the productivity of farming. As noted earlier, F could be interpreted broadly to represent a variety of impediments to adoption-a threshold price on the rental of machinery, learning costs, technological lumpiness, and so on. In all other respects the farmers are identical. As 5 Even renting space in a truck to carry goods to market represents a lumpy cost (Emran and Shilpi 2002) . Hayami and Kawagoe (1993) note that the transportation cost in Indonesia is Rp. 5/kg or higher for a load up to 200kg by pony wagon, but that the cost declines to Rp. 2.5/kg if a two-ton load is carried by a small truck. discussed above, the fixed costs may be financial or non-pecuniary, and may arise for a number of reasons that have been frequently documented in the literature.
There is only one period with two stages. Production decisions are made sequentially. In the first stage each farmer independently decides whether to pay the fixed costs and adopt the productivity-enhancing technology, or remain with the traditional technology. Having made this technology decision, in the second stage each farmer determines how much to produce and how much of this output to sell in a market (or conversely, to consume in the household). For simplicity we start with the case of two farmers indexed i (more modern) and j (traditional). By backward induction the final stage is solved first.
Modern Farmers
The utility function of the modern farmer is simply given by
where B i is the quantity of goods bought from the market for consumption by farmer i, and δ i is the proportion of goods produced, (y i ), that are consumed at home by the household (i.e., the amount sold to markets is (1 − δ i )y i ). Equation (1) is maximized subject to the following constraints. The production function is y i = W γ i , where 0 < γ < 1 and the input W is supplied under competitive markets at price v. The budget constraint is
where t and t B are transport costs for goods y and B, respectively; and p and p B are the given market prices of farm output and consumption good B, respectively. Further, F is the fixed cost for using technology y i = W γ i , and v is the variable cost. By equation (2) sales of goods produced
must equal total expenditures; that is, the sum of spending for consumption goods ((p B + t B ) B i ), the purchase of the input (vW i ), and the fixed cost for using the improved technology (F). Maximizing equation (1) subject to equation (2) and solving the first-order condition yields the following endogenous variables:
where ε = αγ.
Substituting these into equation (1) defines the indirect utility function
Intuitively, the first term on the right-hand side is the utility obtained from consuming good B, which is purchased from the market. This utility is declining in the net price of good B, the fixed cost of technology adoption, and the variable costs of production, all of which lower the farmer's effective purchasing power. Utility is conversely rising in the net sale price of the farmed good and the weight given to good B in the utility function. On the other hand, in the second term utility from consuming the home good rises with the relative weight of the good in the utility function and the cost of purchasing the alternative good from the market. In sum, for given preferences, factors that raise effective purchasing power and liquidity raise farmer utility and vice-versa. The amount of each good that is consumed is determined by preference parameters of the utility function and the opportunity costs of consuming that good.
Traditional Farmer
The farmer with the traditional technology has identical preferences. The only difference is that they pay no fixed costs and thus utilize a less efficient technology. The traditional farmer's maximization problem is given by
which by an analogous procedure yields the indirect utility function
Equation (9) has a similar interpretation to equation (6).
Technology Choice
Given these production and utility levels, in stage one farmers will (or will not) switch from subsistence farming to modern farming if
Substituting from equations (6) and (9) and rearranging, we obtain
Suppose next that farmers are situated at a range of locations with differing transport costs t h ∈ t 0 , . . . ,t, . . . T , where t 0 < t * < T. Define t * such that for some
Observe that at * farmers are indifferent between the technologies. We obtain the following results: Result 1. At locations t h < t * , farmers will find it profitable to switch to the improved technology, whereas at locations with t h > t * , farmers will remain with the old technology.
Since is continuous in t, then from the Intermediate Value Theorem it follows that for locations where t h < t * , then > F * and these farmers switch to the improved technology, whereas on locations with t h > t * , then < F * , and it pays to remain with the old technology. 
and by analogy
The analysis therefore suggests two hypotheses that we test in subsequent sections. First, the model suggests that the adoption of new technologies will be more pervasive where transport costs are lower (Result 1). Second, the model predicts that reductions in transport costs will have a larger impact on the output of farmers utilizing modern farming techniques (Result 2). In the following sections, these hypotheses are tested using a variety of publicly available data sets.
Data on Transportation Costs and Instruments
Estimating the effect of transportation costs on technology choice and crop production requires data on the complete road network for Nigeria, as well as the associated costs of moving between any two points. To our knowledge, no complete, definitive dataset exists that accurately includes Nigeria's entire road network. Recognizing the importance of accurately estimating transportation costs, several sources of data were utilized to construct the transportation network used in this article. The road network vector data was obtained from Delorme, which is useful in that it includes both trunk roads as well as the rural road network. 6 The costs of travel are calculated by taking account of road attributes (including road class, i.e., primary, secondary, or tertiary; paving status, i.e., paved and unpaved; and road quality, i.e., good, fair, and poor) that were obtained from two sources: Nigeria's Federal Roads Maintenance Agency (FERMA), and a specialized road survey that was conducted using the World Bank's Fadama program.
7 This information was digitized and merged into the Delorme dataset.
8 Next, the costs of traveling along each segment of the road were computed using the Highway Development Management Model (HDM-4), which is a standard application used by road engineers that considers the road attributes, as well as roughness of the terrain, and country-level factors (e.g., the price of fuel, the cost of purchasing and maintaining a heavy truck, and wages), in order to calculate the cost, in USD, of transporting one ton of goods along each segment of the road network.
9 With this information, the cost of traveling from each SPAM cell (section 5) or each LSMS household (section 6) to the cheapest market was calculated, where a market is defined as a city with at least 100,000 people. This was done using an iterative algorithm in which the cost of traveling to every market along every possible route is calculated for each location. The cheapest market/route combination is then selected. In the online supplementary appendix, we present results where the city population size threshold is changed from 100,000 to 50,000, 25,000, and 10,000 to show that our results are robust to small market sizes.
Endogeneity bias is a familiar problem when estimating the impact of roads. Roads are non-randomly placed and tend to be built to connect areas with higher economic potential. Hence, estimates need to take these placement effects into account when looking at the impact of roads: there may be higher levels of economic activity in an area because of a higher density of roads, or there may be a higher density of roads because there was originally greater economic potential.
In order to correct for the endogeneity of road placement, we use a novel instrumental 7 For more information about the survey and GIS methodology, see "Spatial Analysis and GIS Modeling to Promote Private Investment in Agricultural Processing Zones: Nigeria's Staple Crop Processing Zones" presented at the Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty 2013. 8 Roads that are in the Delorme dataset but do not appear in FERMA or our survey data are characterized as being of the lowest quality (tertiary class, unpaved, and poor condition). 9 For specific details on what goes into the HDM-4 model, and on the final estimated costs, see the online supplementary appendix.
variable (IV) for transport costs which we refer to as the natural path. The natural path variable measures the time it would take to walk from the area of production (for SPAM this is the center of each gridded cell in Nigeria, and for the LSMS it is the georeferenced location of each enumeration area) to the cheapest market as described above, in the absence of any transportation infrastructure.
10 Under the assumption that impediments to pedestrians correlate highly with impediments to road construction, the natural path variable is the best estimate for the ideal placement of a road in a cost-minimization only framework (i.e., positioning the path of a road to be the most cost efficient, without making deviations from this path to connect areas with higher economic potential). The natural path variable is therefore completely exogenous with respect to the economic benefits of the transportation network. It also correlates highly with transportation costs because points that require a shorter amount of time to walk generally also have lower transportation costs (both because they are usually closer together, and because they have less rough terrain between them). This is a similar approach to that of Faber (2014) , who uses a hypothetical least cost path.
This variable represents a significant improvement over the Euclidean Distance, or "straight-line," IVs typically used in the literature, as it better captures what the straight line is trying to measure; namely, the most logical path to the market absent any confounding, bias-causing factors. Straight-line IVs, while they do capture the shortest path "as the crow flies" between any two points, do not consider the fact that the underlying terrain may be impassable, or especially costly to travel through. They are therefore not as accurate an approximation of the cheapest route to construct a road between two points as the natural path, and therefore may be a less efficient instrument. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we also test alternative specifications using Euclidean distance as the instrument, and find our results to be robust to this change (see the online supplementary appendix).
Spatially-aggregated Agricultural Production Analysis
In order to motivate our empirical analysis, we first use spatial data to determine the impact of transportation costs on crop production under different input systems. We use a dataset on crop production, SPAM, which disaggregates crop production statistics into 5 arc minute × 5 arc minute (approximately 10 km × 10 km) cells throughout the entire country of Nigeria (HarvestChoice 2012). This dataset is useful for our purposes since it clearly distinguishes between the production of various crops using different input systems, categorized as follows: subsistence, low-input, high-input, and irrigated.
11 We pair these categories together to map them into conventional definitions of traditional (subsistence and low-input) and modern (high-input which may, but need not, include irrigated land) production. Examining the effects of transport costs on traditional and modern input systems separately provides an indication of the possibly differential impacts of transport costs on agricultural output (as suggested by Result 2 from our empirical model).
SPAM Model and Data
The data used in this analysis is spatially organized into a gridded framework. The total land area of Nigeria is split into pixels, which line up with the SPAM cells described above. Each pixel is a unique observation. An agricultural production function is estimated for four crops: yams, rice, cassava, and maize. These crops were chosen because they are the most widely grown in Nigeria, and combined they represent more than 60% of the total agricultural production value in Nigeria in 2011 according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
12 Cassava and maize are typically grown using low inputs, for home consumption-in fact, in Nigeria, neither of these crops have modern production according to SPAM-while yams and rice are more commonly marketed and are grown under both traditional and modern crop management regimes. The agricultural production function takes the form of
where Y j ik is total production of crop j in pixel i using input system k, where k can be traditional (subsistence/low-input, as coded by SPAM) or modern (high-input) inputs. T i moreover, is transportation costs from cell i to the cheapest market, with a market being defined as a city of at least 100,000 residents, and is a vector of control variables. To correct for potential bias due to the nonrandom placement of roads, equation (11) is estimated using two-stage least squares, where the natural path variable described in the prior section is used as the instrument for transportation costs.
13 Results in the online supplementary appendix show that results are robust to alternative definitions of various controls, an alternative instrumental variable, and several different thresholds for the size of a city to be considered a market.
Several spatial datasets were utilized or generated to control for confounding variables, including population, agro-ecological production potential, and distance to mining facilities. Population data comes from LandScan (2006), which uses satellite imagery analysis to disaggregate census data into a gridded network.
14 Agro-ecological potential data is from Global Agro-ecological Zones (GAEZ), a product of FAO, which considers climate and soil conditions to estimate the maximum potential yields in each pixel, for each crop (FAO and IIASA 2011). 15 Euclidean distance to the nearest mining facility is calculated using data from the National Minerals Information Center of 13 Note that as one would expect, the SPAM dataset contains many zero values for production due to the fact that much of the land in Nigeria is uninhabited or unsuitable for agriculture. These observations remain in the sample and are treated as zeros (a very small number is added to each, to allow for the logarithmic transformation) unless they meet any of the conditions listed at the end of Spam Model and Data section. The IV Tobit specifications were tested and yield qualitatively similar results to 2SLS regressions. However, they were omitted from the article because a Tobit specification is only appropriate when there is censoring or truncation of the data, which is not present. The number of zeros by crop and production system is shown in table 1.
14 LandScan population data is available at: http://web.ornl. gov/sci/landscan/landscan_data_avail.shtml. 15 The data used in this model assumes climactic conditions similar to the 1961-1990 baseline level. GAEZ also differentiates potential yields by input system. For our traditional input equation, we use potential yields under low inputs, and for our modern input equation we use potential yields under high inputs. the U.S. Geological Survey, and is included to account for the fact that mining facilities often have high concentrations of workers and their families, making them very high demand centers.
16 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in this analysis. Because this analysis is focused on agricultural production, which mainly occurs in rural areas, urban areas were removed from the dataset. 17 In addition, pixels falling entirely in water, and pixels in which there is zero agricultural potential according to GAEZ for the particular crop being regressed are also omitted from the analysis. All other pixels are included.
SPAM Results
The results from the SPAM analysis for yams and rice are displayed in tables 2 and 3, respectively. Only traditional-level production results are given for cassava and maize in tables 4 and 5, respectively, as there is no modern input production of these crops in Nigeria, according to SPAM. In each table, regressions using ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares are summarized. Due to the large number of regressions, for brevity we omit the first-stage regression results. Nevertheless, coefficients on all instrumental variables are highly statistically significant in the first stage (p < 0.01), and positive, as theory would predict.
Turning first to the variable of interest, the cost of traveling to market, column 2 in tables 2 and 3 show that as the cost to market increases, modern production of yams and rice decline with elasticities of −0.32 and −0.53, respectively. This is as we would expect-lower transport costs leads 16 We considered only a subset of mining facilities available in the raw data. Facilities selected were those that involved the extraction of minerals or hydrocarbons from the ground (specifically coal, tin, iron, nitrogen, and petroleum), or the processing of hydrocarbons. Mining facilities that were in the USGS dataset but not included in this analysis include facilities like cement plants, or steel mills, which are likely concentrated in large cities or manufacturing areas. We only considered plants that were considered active between 2006 and 2010. 17 The methodology for determining which pixels of the Landscan dataset are urban areas went as follows. Nigeria's urbanization rate as defined by the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook was 49.6% in 2011 (see https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html).
The total population in the Landscan dataset is approximately 136 million, implying an urban population of 67 million. The pixels with the largest number of people according to Landscan are marked as being urban pixels until the total number of people living in these marked pixels equals 67 million. These marked pixel are then omitted from the regressions. to greater modern production of these two crops. However, the results are strikingly different when these crops are produced under traditional production systems. Notably, transportation costs have no statistically significant effect on traditional production of yams and cassava, and traditional production of rice and maize actually increase when transport costs rise. In the context of our model, there are two reasons why this relationship might hold. The first reason is that traditional farmers do not generate sufficient marketable surplus to benefit from cheaper transportation to markets. This finding is consistent with Result 2 from the theoretical model and is a plausible explanation for the results observed for cassava and yams.
The results for rice and maize, however, require a different explanation since not only does reducing transport costs not lead to increased traditional production of these two crops, it actually leads to decreased levels. Note: Sample includes all non-urban cells that have positive yams production potential according to FAO (high input potential in columns 1 and 2, and low input potential in columns 3 and 4). Columns 1 and 2 present coefficients from OLS and 2SLS regressions, respectively, with ln(modern yams production) being the dependent variable. Columns 3 and 4 present coefficients from similar regressions with ln(traditional yams production) as the dependent variable. T-statistics are in parentheses: * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, and * * * p < 0.01.
This could be explained by Result 1: that when transportation costs decline, farmers find it profitable to switch to more modern inputs. This leads to a reduction in traditional production in the aggregate statistics, while at the same time aggregate production of these crops actually increases-some production is simply shifted from traditional to modern agriculture. Briefly turning to the control variables, population has a positive but diminishing effect on production of the four crops, under both input systems, with the exception of modern rice production, where coefficients on both the linear and squared terms are insignificant. This is what one would expect-when holding other inputs constant, additional labor will lead to more production but will exhibit diminishing marginal returns as land becomes crowded. Further, crop production tends to decline with distance to a mining facility, as was originally hypothesized. Finally, all four crops exhibit a non-linear relationship between agricultural potential (land and climate suitability) and actual production. Modern production of yams and rice display a convex relationship between the two, implying increasing returns to crop suitability. Conversely, traditional production of yams, rice, maize, and cassava show a concave relationship, implying diminishing returns to crop suitability. This relationship is perhaps not surprising. Traditional producers are not able to take advantage of better climate and soil conditions as much as modern producers might be.
The empirical model presented here provides preliminary evidence of the results predicted by our theoretical model. However, due to the fact that the dataset is aggregated at the geographic level, rather than at the household, it is not possible to directly assess whether variations in transport costs induce shifts in technology choice. The next section Note: Sample includes all non-urban cells that have positive rice production potential according to FAO (high input potential in columns 1 and 2, and low input potential in columns 3 and 4). Columns 1 and 2 present coefficients from OLS and 2SLS regressions, respectively, with ln(modern rice production) as the dependent variable. Columns 3 and 4 present coefficients from similar regressions with ln(traditional rice production) as the dependent variable. T-statistics are in parentheses: * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, and * * * p < 0.01.
tests for this, and the other predictions of our empirical model, using household level survey data from the LSMS-ISA.
Household Agricultural Production Analysis
Next, we extend the analysis by focusing on the household level using LSMS-ISA data. This rich survey data enables us to explore the underlying mechanism behind increased production, and to further test the hypotheses suggested by our theoretical model. We test the impact of transport costs on the probability of adopting modern technology (Result 1), and how the impact of transport costs varies with technology choices (Result 2).
LSMS-ISA Model and Data
To test the above hypotheses, a two-step treatment effects model is employed, which is summarized in equations (12) and (13):
Equation (12) is the treatment equation, suggesting that the choice of adopting modern technology (dM i = 1) depends on transport costs (T i ), an exclusion restriction (θ i ), and a vector of control variables (X i ). The control variables we include in the selection equation are total land of the household, age and age squared of the household head, a dummy indicating whether the head is literate, amount of fertilizer purchased, and distance to the nearest mine. Equation (13) investigates how transport costs (T i ) influence crop revenue (R i ) for those farmers who adopt Note: Sample includes all non-urban cells that have positive low-input cassava production potential according to FAO. Columns 1 and 2 present coefficients from OLS and 2SLS regressions, respectively, with ln(traditional cassava production) being the dependent variable, and t-statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, and * * * p < 0.01. more modern techniques (i.e., the subsample for which dM i = 1). Equation (13) omits the exclusion restriction used in equation (12), which is described below, and uses as controls the other variables in equation (12), as well as a set of additional controls. These include whether the plot is irrigated, the number of household members engaged in agricultural labor, and fixed effects indicating the agro-ecological zone (there are four agro-ecological zones in Nigeria: tropicwarm/semi-arid, tropic-warm/sub-humid, tropic-warm/humid, and tropic-cool/subhumid). To account for possible selection bias, the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), λ i , enters equation (13) and is discussed further below. Summary statistics for the data used in the LSMS analysis are given in table 6.
Machinery usage is used as a proxy for the adoption of more modern technologies (dM i ). The choice of this indicator is guided Note: Sample includes all non-urban cells that have positive low-input maize production potential according to FAO. Columns 1 and 2 present coefficients from OLS and 2SLS regressions, respectively, with ln(traditional maize production) as the dependent variable, and t-statistics in parentheses: * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, and * * * p < 0.01.
by pragmatism and data availability, as well as the need to find an indicator that reflects more market-driven decisions by the farmer. One potential proxy-use of irrigation-was ruled out because it is more a function of geography and location of the farm, and is not available to farmers outside of suitable areas. Another possible proxy is the use of fertilizers or improved seeds. However, the use of these inputs was (and is) heavily subsidized in Nigeria, at levels that varied over time and across states, in ways that could not be discerned from the LSMS data (the subsidy was up to 100% for seeds in recent years). Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, subsidized inputs were rationed; who received them and who did not was determined by who had access to the government programs, not by market demand. So farmers' decisions on their use were strongly influenced by factors that could not be accounted for in Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the Nigeria, LSMS-ISA survey. Column 1 shows statistics for the full sample, column 2 for the subsample of mechanized farmers, and column 3 for the subsample of traditional farmers. Cost to Market is the minimum cost of transporting one ton of goods to a city of at least 100,000.
the estimations. 18 Machinery, in contrast, must be either bought or rented at more or less market rates, and is typically associated with the use of more modern production technologies and a greater investment in inputs. The government of Nigeria does provide some subsidization of tractor services. However, our definition of mechanization is much broader and includes any farmers who responded in the survey that they used any modern machinery or equipment. It is only tractor purchases and services that receive subsidies, so a large majority of the farmers classified as mechanized would not be recipients of any subsidy. Furthermore, use of the subsidies was very small compared 18 Throughout the late 2000s, the government maintained a virtual monopoly on the distribution of fertilizer and seeds. In 2012 a new administration instituted some genuine reforms that significantly reduced the government's direct involvement, and gave access to more farmers (i.e., beyond those that had connections) but the subsidies continued through a voucher scheme.
to those on fertilizer and seeds.
19 Consequently, the use of machinery-tractors or equipment-seems to be much more reflective of a farmer's decision to modernize than would use of subsidized and rationed fertilizer or seeds.
The parameters of interest are α 1 and β 1 , which indicate the causal effect of transport costs on the probability of becoming mechanized (Result 1), and on crop revenue of mechanized farmers (Result 2), respectively. As noted earlier, the endogeneity of roads complicates the identification of these parameters, as does the potential selection bias in equation (13).
To address both the endogeneity and potential sample selection, we implement a two-stage estimation process. First, equation (12) is estimated using IV-Probit, followed by the estimation of equation (13) by two-stage least squares. The endogeneity issue is overcome in both equations by instrumenting for transport costs with the natural path variable. In equation (13) the IMR accounts for possible sample selection bias.
20 Two alternative exclusion restrictions (θ i ) are tested. The first is non-agricultural income of the household. There are typically indivisibilities in the purchase or rental of machinery (such as a minimum cost). As such, farmers with greater endowments of non-agricultural income would be better positioned to pay for these. Non-agricultural income should therefore positively influence the likelihood of machinery adoption, but should not necessarily have a direct effect on actual crop revenue, once selection is taken into account. Further, we control for the amount of other inputs such as fertilizer purchased to account for the possibility that income may be spent on other agricultural inputs besides machinery.
The second exclusion restriction tested is neighborhood effects of machinery use in the area. Neighborhood effects are computed by calculating the percentage of households using machinery within the enumeration area, leaving out the household under consideration. It is well established in the literature that neighborhood effects have a strong influence on a household's adoption of new technologies. For example, Conley and Udry (2010) find strong evidence that pineapple farmers in Ghana adjust their fertilizer use based on their neighbors' experiences. Thus, we expect the neighborhood effects of machinery use to positively influence the likelihood of adopting machinery, but not to impact the revenue from crop production. Because richer areas (those with higher non-agricultural income) are more likely to use machinery, non-agricultural income and average machinery use within an enumeration area are highly correlated. We therefore include them one at a time, and report both results as a robustness check (see online supplementary appendix). Note: This table reports the results of the IV-probit estimation. Column 1 includes non-agricultural income as the exclusion restriction, and column 2 includes average machinery use in the village instead. Robust t-statistics appear in parenthesis: * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, and * * * p < 0.01. Table 7 presents the IV-Probit estimates of equation (12), using two alternative specifications. We test the two exclusion restrictions described above: in column 1 we use the nonagricultural income and in column 2 we use the neighborhood effects of machinery use (both as natural logarithms), with transport costs instrumented with the natural path IV. In both cases, we see that the exclusion restrictions are positive and significant at the 5% level, giving support that they are both valid exclusion restrictions. In column 1, we see that a 10% increase in transportation costs reduces the probability that a farmer uses mechanized farming techniques by 2.4%. Similarly, estimates in column 2 indicate that a 10% increase in transportation costs reduces that same probability by 3.5% (note that these estimates are statistically indistinguishable from each other according to a difference in means test). In both cases, the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. This is clear evidence in support of Result 1-that reducing transportation costs induces a "technological switch" from non-mechanized to mechanized farming.
LSMS-ISA Results
Next, we explore the results from the second stage of the two-step Heckman. Table 8 reports the IV-estimates of the augmented outcome equation, which includes the IMR as an additional control. Column 1 uses IMR 1 , which was calculated using Note: This table reports the 2SLS estimates without including the Heckman correction. Column 1 uses the full sample, column 2 uses the sub-sample of mechanized farmers, and column 3 uses the sub-sample of traditional farmers. Robust t-statistics appear in parenthesis: * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, and * * * p < 0.01.
the log non-agricultural income, and column 2 uses IMR 2 , which is computed using machinery-use neighborhood effects. Control variables include those from the selection equation in addition to whether the plot is irrigated, agricultural labor, as well as climate (agro-ecological zone fixed effects).
In both cases, the results indicate that cost to market has a significantly negative impact on the crop revenue of mechanized farmers. We find that decreasing transport costs by 10% would increase crop revenue by 35%. While this elasticity seems quite high, it is important to note that it reflects the benefit from reducing transport costs for those farmers who are most impacted by transportation costs-mechanized, and more commercialized farmers. This elasticity also represents gross benefits, and are not net of input costs. Note also that the coefficients on both alternate IMRs are not significant, suggesting that selection bias is not present.
Given the absence of evidence of selection bias, IV estimates are presented in table 9 which do not control for the IMR. Column 1 estimates the model for the full sample, column 2 focuses on the subsample of mechanized farmers, and column 3 the traditional farmers. There is striking evidence of a heterogeneity of impacts that vary with technology adoption. As predicted by our theoretical model, the coefficient on transport costs is significantly lower for nonmechanized farmers, at −1.9 (table 9, column 3) than it is for mechanized farmers, at −3.4 (table 9, column 2). This is clear evidence of Result 2: reducing transport costs benefits farmers using modern inputs significantly more than traditional-input farmers.
In sum, we find compelling evidence to support our hypotheses that reducing transport costs will entice more farmers to switch to more mechanized forms of agriculture, and that the mechanized farmers are more sensitive to variations on transport costs. These findings are robust to alternative specifications (see the online supplementary appendix) and to controlling for sources of endogeneity and selection biases.
Conclusions
While it has long been recognized in the literature that reducing transport costs will induce greater market participation and increase welfare, we take a fresh look at the underlying mechanisms.
Using two sources of data-SPAM and LSMS-ISA-we analyze the impact of transportation costs on the adoption of modern inputs and on its potentially differential effect on modern versus traditional farmers. We present robust evidence that a reduction of transport costs will increase the adoption of modern technologies. Further, we demonstrate that transport costs have a greater impact on modern as compared to traditional farmers.
From the analysis of the spatially aggregated SPAM data, we find that when transport costs are reduced, crop production under a high-input regime is increased, while crops produced under a low-input regime are either unaffected or may see a decline in output. It is likely that this decline in lowinput production is explained by the switch towards more modern agriculture. From the LSMS household survey analysis, we find evidence supporting our hypothesis that reducing transport costs increases the likelihood of modern technology use. Further, we find that all farmers (both modern and traditional) see an increase in crop revenue when transport costs decline, but modern farmers' revenue increases by a significantly greater margin. These findings are consistent with the implications of our theoretical model.
In sum, we present compelling evidence that the constraints to the adoption of modern technologies and access to markets are interconnected and so they should be targeted jointly. For example, reducing transport costs to the market may not be enough to push the local economy towards a more favorable equilibrium. It may be necessary to also expand access to credit, which would enable farmers to cover the fixed costs involved in modernization. By the same token, expanding credit by itself may not be enough of a push either if market access is insufficient or too costly. In order to increase yields in SSA, there is a need for policies that bundle these interventions, focusing on improving both technology availability and connectivity. There are, however, a host of issues that have not been explored in this article that warrant greater scrutiny. For example, it would be instructive to explore if there is an empirically identifiable level of transport costs at which farmers switch from one to another technology, and more importantly for policy, what this threshold cost depends upon. This would allow policy makers to prioritize investments in areas where a switch to commercialization is more likely. The interaction with other policy variables such as credit, extension services, and market support also deserve some attention.
